Post Office Scandal Update and Insights: Organisational Culture Risks and Governance Issues

Described by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) as the “most widespread miscarriage of justice” and “the biggest single series of wrongful convictions in British legal history”, the Post Office Horizon scandal is a devastating reflection of severe failures rooted in organisational culture and corporate governance. Brought to the public attention via the media, including extensive reporting by Computer Weekly and many other well known media outlets, the Post Office scandal fully came into the limelight after the ITV drama Mr Bates vs The Post Office aired on Netflix on  January 1st, 2024.

In total, a shocking 700 individuals were charged with crimes like theft, fraud, and false accounting and over 230 subpostmasters and subpostmistresses were sent to prison after being prosecuted by the Post Office. These prosecutions had devastating consequences, and to date, four subpostmasters have taken their own lives. Reputations have been ruined, lives derailed, and families torn apart, all due to the Post Office’s continued refusal to acknowledge any issues with Horizon’s system.

Instead of investigating the repeated complaints about shortfalls and discrepancies, the Post Office insisted the system’s accounts were correct and the system could not be accessed externally. They continued to uphold this claim, even with the disclosures in the Second Sight report, which included an admission in September 2012 from Gareth Jenkins, a Fujitsu engineer, that unauthorised access or data manipulation was not only feasible but also frequently occurred without the subpostmasters’ instruction or permission. 

Yet, in the face of such a monumental disclosure, Paula Vennells, the Post Office’s Chief Executive Officer at the time and the Post Office leadership remained unwavering in their defence of the system’s integrity. This refusal to acknowledge the system’s vulnerabilities and the potential for remote interference laid the foundation for one of the biggest miscarriages of justice in UK history.

In this Post Office scandal update, we will examine the timeline of key events since the implementation of the Horizon system and investigate how cultural risks and governance issues contributed to the scandal.

Implementation of the Horizon System

The Horizon system was implemented in 2000. Within months of its implementation, Alan Bates was among the first of numerous subpostmasters to report issues with the system. 

Key Dates

• 2003: Subpostmaster Alan Bates and his wife lost £65,000 they had invested after his contract with the Post Office was terminated due to his refusal to accept culpability for apparent losses in his branch account.
• 2009: Computer Weekly was the first media outlet to publish that postmasters who reported issues faced fraud accusations, subsequent prosecution and bankruptcy. 

Amidst mounting allegations and evidence of injustice, Alan Bates formed the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance (JFSA). The JFSA pursued legal action, filing a landmark class-action lawsuit in the High Court of England and Wales. With the weight of 555 claimants behind it, the lawsuit carried the voices of those who had endured reputational ruin, financial devastation, and even incarceration due to the defective computer platform. 

By taking their fight to the highest civil court, the JFSA aimed to secure justice for its members and expose the systemic failures in the Post Office.

• 2012: Paula Vennells was appointed as CEO of the Post Office. Vennells continued to deny there was a problem with the Horizon system, sending a letter to Lord Arbuthnot stating there was “no evidence” of issues with the system. In the letter, she also said, “We have no reason to doubt the integrity of the system, which we remain confident is robust and fit for purpose.”

The Second Sight Independent Inquiry

As the Post Office relentlessly pursued criminal prosecutions against subpostmasters, mounting concerns emerged regarding the reliability of the Horizon computer system at the heart of the allegations. In 2012, facing escalating pressure from Members of Parliament and the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance group, the Post Office finally commissioned an independent investigation with Second Sight, a forensic accounting firm. 

The results of this investigation would either confirm the Post Office’s steadfast faith in the system’s infallibility or reveal possible weaknesses that had resulted in the prosecution of hundreds of subpostmasters, so the decision carried enormous implications.

Key Dates

• 2013: According to an interim analysis by Second Sight, Post Office Ltd. conceded Horizon had software bugs, but it still believed the system was operating as intended. One hundred and fifty subpostmasters filed claims, alleging the Horizon accounting system was”faulty.” Subsequently, the Post Office launched the Post Office Independent Postmaster Mediation Scheme.
• 2015: The Post Office scandal was brought to public attention by two probing BBC investigations into its actions. The first was a segment on the series Inside Out, followed by a more in-depth Panorama episode titled “Trouble at the Post Office?”

The situation then took a dramatic turn when journalist Nick Wallis published the confidential  Second Sight final report online. This report, which the Post Office had instructed Second Sight to halt one day before its scheduled release and discard all remaining materials, revealed that:

1. Gareth Jenkins, a Fujitsu engineer and one of the chief architects of the Horizon system, admitted in September 2012 that remote access to branch terminals occurred routinely without explicit consent or awareness of the subpostmasters operating those terminals. This statement undermined the Post Office’s stance that the system was robust and privileged information could not be accessed improperly.
2. The independent investigation firm Second Sight raised serious concerns about prosecutorial misconduct committed by the Post Office legal team. They alleged key evidence was concealed or misrepresented during the prosecution of subpostmasters accused of falsifying accounts based on errors generated by the faulty Horizon IT system.
3. In 2012, the Post Office issued a “litigation hold” instruction, which should have mandated the preservation of all relevant documents from that point forward. However, evidence suggests this legal obligation may have been ignored, potentially destroying crucial evidence.
4. A collection of documents known as “CD1” surfaced. It allegedly comprised an exhaustive log of prosecution records, including legal counsel given to the Post Office as early as September 2012. 

Following the revelations from the Second Sight report, the Post Office abruptly terminated the independent Postmaster Mediation Scheme. Lord James Arbuthnot’s decision to bring the Post Office IT dispute before the House of Lords further increased public attention to the scandal.

Further compounding the Post Office’s troubles, a software bug was disclosed in an email from Post Office IT support to a member of the Communications Workers Union (CWU) representing postmasters. Recognising the gravity of the issue, the CWU promptly sent a letter in November 2015, alerting subpostmasters to the systemic problem within the Horizon system.

Start of Civil Litigation

The High Court approved a Group Litigation Order (GLO) against Post Office Ltd, brought by the Justice for Sub Postmasters Alliance (JFSA), represented by Freeths Solicitors.

Key Dates

• 2017: The Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance group, composed of 555 former subpostmasters and postmistresses, filed a group litigation in the High Court against the Post Office.
• 2018: In the New Year’s Honours, Vennells accepted a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) in recognition of her “services to the Post Office and to charity”.
• 2019: In a landmark ruling, the High Court found that the Horizon software possessed errors, failures, and faults. Despite this legal victory, the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance (JFSA) faced a difficult predicament. With their resources drained by the costly legal battle, they could not sustain the additional expenses required to pursue their claims further. Faced with this harsh reality, the JFSA reluctantly agreed to accept a £57.75 million settlement offer from the Post Office.

However, the cost of the protracted legal proceedings was staggering. An estimated £46 million had already been spent on legal fees, leaving each claimant with an average meagre compensation of around £20,000. This sum was a bitter pill to swallow, made even more difficult by the condition imposed by the Post Office that this settlement would be considered a full and final resolution, barring any future claims for additional compensation unless a conviction was successfully overturned.

Following this, Paula Vennells resigned with a staggering £400,000 in salary and bonuses, a sum approximately 20 times higher than the individual compensations received by the subpostmasters.

The Post Office Scandal Public Inquiry

Key Dates

• 2020: The Metropolitan Police launched a criminal investigation into possible charges of perjury and perverting the course of justice. Following an independent public inquiry into the Horizon IT scandal, the first convictions were overturned for six subpostmasters, including Alan Bates.
• 2021: At the Court of Appeal, the convictions of a further 39 postmasters were overturned. Under the direction of Sir Wyn Williams, the Post Office Horizon IT inquiry was made a statutory inquiry, but the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance (JFSA) refused to participate, calling it a whitewash. 

It was announced in a press release, “Government to Fund Initial Compensation Package for Vindicated Postmasters,” that postmasters who had convictions overturned would get up to £100,000 in interim compensation.

• 2022: The Group Litigation Order compensation scheme was launched for postmasters who received compensation as a result of the Group Litigation Order (GLO) against the Post Office in 2019. However, this was only open to postmasters who didn’t have Horizon-related convictions.
• 2023: The Government announced every wrongly convicted subpostmaster would be offered a full and final settlement of £600,000 in compensation.
• 2024: The ITV drama Mr Bates vs The Post Office aired for the first time in January.

The Post Office and Horizon Redress: Instruction to Deliver report was published by the House of Commons on March 7th, 2024.  On March 13th, the Government put forward legislation to automatically overturn convictions related to Horizon. Former Post Office chairman Mr Staunton, who assumed the position in December 2022, was dismissed by Business Secretary Kemi Badenoch.

The Post Office Horizon IT Public Inquiry Upcoming Dates

• Phase 5 and 6: Exploring Responses To The Scandal and Governance began on April 9th and will conclude on July 31st.
• Phase 7: Current Practice and Procedure and Recommendations for the Future is expected to begin in September.

Paula Vennells Faces Tough Questions on Post Office’s Culture of Blame

Former Post Office CEO Paula Vennells faced intense questioning over three days at the ongoing inquiry, where counsel Jason Beer KC highlighted a pervasive culture of blame within the organisation. The inquiry delved into the systemic issues and mismanagement that led to the wrongful convictions of subpostmasters and subpostmistresses.

Remote Access, Selective Testing, and Flawed Investigations

Beer scrutinised the Second Sight review proposal, which suggested selectively testing the Horizon IT system for bugs. “Searching for bugs in the system was exactly what was needed, wasn’t it? It didn’t happen though, did it?” Beer asked. 

Vennells admitted, “The work did not come to a final conclusion, no.”

The inquiry also explored remote access to Horizon by Fujitsu IT experts. An Ernst & Young audit in 2011 flagged the risk of unrestricted access, potentially leading to unauthorised transactions. Vennells admitted, “I accept fully that this is what the document said,” though she claimed limited understanding of its implications at the time.

Furthermore, a 2013 report by independent consultants Detica, expressing serious concerns over the system, was not shown to Vennells. She admitted that had she seen it, it would have been a “red flag” regarding potential Horizon issues.

When Second Sight completed an interim report in July 2013, a Post Office statement made no reference to the three bugs the investigators identified, instead pointing to the reliability of Horizon. Beer asked Vennells, “On being told that the system did have bugs, would you not have wanted a watertight assurance from Fujitsu that there were no more bugs?” 

Vennells replied, “I should have asked for that.”

Mismanagement and Accountability

Despite signing off on letters to MPs in 2010 and 2011 containing incorrect guarantees about Horizon, Vennells attributed the inaccuracies to information from specialist managers. She stated, “I would never knowingly have put my name to a letter to an MP which contained inaccuracies.” However, reflecting on the letters, she conceded, “I accept that these statements were wrong.”

Vennells admitted it was a “serious mistake” to be unaware that the Post Office conducted its own criminal investigations into staff until 2012. She said, “The only acceptable answer to the questions you are giving me on this is that I should have known and I should have asked more questions.”

On the third day of her testimony, lawyer Tim Maloney highlighted Vennells’s work to remove a section about the Horizon IT system from the Royal Mail privatisation prospectus in 2013. Vennells admitted to having a reference to Horizon removed from the prospectus. In an email to the then Post Office chair, Alice Perkins, Vennells said she had the mention of Horizon removed, telling her, “I have earned my keep on this one.”

“Although it is something you can’t remember, it was a key achievement for you in that year,” Maloney said. “You were proud that you had intervened to change the prospectus wording.” Maloney explained that concerns about the Post Office IT system were listed under the “risk section” of the prospectus. 

“It was in the risk section… and that was why it had to go, wasn’t it? Because that was very damaging to the Post Office?” Vennells replied, “It would have been, and as I explained this morning, it would have been wrong for that to have been taken and misrepresented in some way because, at this time, the Post Office believed that the Horizon system was working.”

The inquiry showed a document entitled “Paula Vennells: Review of achievements against 2013/14 personal achievements,” which listed her intervention to change the prospectus wording as a key achievement. Vennells admitted that, in hindsight, this was the wrong decision, acknowledging there were issues with the system.

Writing in a note, Vennells shared her thoughts about Susan Crichton’s handling of the independent study conducted by Second Sight: “My reflection on what happened with Susan Crichton … is that Susan was possibly more loyal to her professional conduct requirements and put her integrity as a lawyer above the interest of the business.”

Information Withheld from the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC)

Paula Vennells admitted that the Post Office failed to inform the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) about concerns over one of its expert witnesses. The CCRC wrote to her in July 2013 asking for information about convictions that may be affected by issues around the Horizon system. At the time, Vennells was aware that Fujitsu engineer Gareth Jenkins, who gave evidence in several trials, had been withdrawn as a witness.

Jason Beer KC said it would have been “the right and honest thing” for the Post Office to let the CCRC know this promptly. 

“Yes, it would,” Vennells replied.

 Beer asked Vennells to clarify that this did not ultimately happen until years later. She replied: “I understand that to be the case now, yes.” 

Media Coverage and Internal Reactions

Following a 2014 BBC broadcast by journalist Nick Wallis, which exposed the scandal, Vennells described the reporting as “unhelpful and inaccurate” and wrote an email to senior colleagues stating, “I was more bored than outraged.” This statement indicated a dismissive attitude towards serious allegations raised by the media.

On day three of the inquiry, Venells was caught out by documentary evidence. Vennells had just told the inquiry she “would never have taken a decision based on the advice of one colleague,” referring to her chief spin doctor, Mark Davies. 

However, an email response to his advice popped up on the screen, stating: “You are right to call this out. And I will take your steer. No issue … There are two objectives, the most urgent being to manage the media.” The email exchange related to a decision on whether to conduct a review of criminal cases going back five to ten years, which the company did not pursue.

Pre-select Committee Briefing and Addendum

Beer referred to a pre-select committee briefing and addendum mentioned in Vennells’ witness statement. He questioned her memory of receiving the addendum from Jane Hill, head of public affairs at the Post Office, in February 2015. The addendum contained prepared responses on mediation statistics, claims, and remote tampering, advising Vennells to stress that there was no remote access enabling branch transaction data to be edited. Vennells claimed she could not recall seeing the addendum.

Mediation to Limit Compensation

Paula Vennells admitted that the Post Office never intended to pay out “substantial” compensation in a scheme to mediate postmasters’ complaints between 2013 and 2015. In an internal email from August 2013, Vennells said the “hope of mediation was to avoid or minimise compensation.” She said executives had “explained that there were steps in place to advise postmasters … [that] this was a chance to be heard and not to expect compensation.”

Culture of Blame

Jason Beer KC accused Paula Vennells of fostering a culture of blame within the Post Office, focusing on the Horizon IT system failures rather than addressing managerial and ethical shortcomings. During the inquiry, Vennells acknowledged that an email she sent in August 2015, which emphasised the priority of protecting the business and those who didn’t encounter difficulties with the Horizon system, “reads badly today.” “I’m sorry, first of all, because this reads badly today,” she admitted, describing the email as “badly worded.”

Beer pressed further, questioning whether Vennells still believed the core issue lay with the IT system rather than with the conduct of Post Office officials. Vennells denied this, attributing her previous comments to a “poor use of words.” She reflected, “One of my reflections on all of us was I was too trusting. I did probe and I did ask questions, and I’m disappointed where information wasn’t shared.”

Halex Consulting: “Paula Vennells’s testimony has made it evident that the wrongful convictions stemmed from severe deficiencies in governance and risk management reporting at the Post Office. Her statements have highlighted a systemic failure to adequately oversee and address issues within the Horizon IT system, ultimately leading to the unjust prosecution of numerous subpostmasters and subpostmistresses. This underscores a profound need for comprehensive reform in the organisation’s oversight and accountability mechanisms to prevent such miscarriages of justice in the future.”

The Next Steps: Post Office and Horizon Redress

In February 2022, the Business and Trade Committee of MPs recommended establishing an independent intermediary body to assist subpostmasters in seeking financial redress. The House of Commons Committee report, “Post Office and Horizon Redress: Instruction to Deliver” — with recommendations to the Government — published on March 7th, 2024, stated that the Government had rejected this recommendation.

The committee described the current redress process as an “abject failure” and demanded that the Post Office be entirely removed from involvement in the three main compensation schemes.

However, in its response, the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) stated, “Setting up a new body to replace these arrangements would take months and cost millions, which should instead be spent on redress for postmasters.”

The DBT asserted that removing the Post Office completely from the process would cause more delays for postmasters who are making compensation claims, although the DBT conceded that decisions in redress cases are currently made independently of the organisation.

Financial Redress for Deceased Postmasters and Family Members

In cases where a postmaster has passed away, their estate can apply for and receive financial redress on their behalf under any of the compensation schemes.

The DBT clarified that many of the impacts experienced by family members would already be compensated for under the various Horizon-related compensation schemes, explained below.

Post Office Scandal Compensation: Current Horizon Compensation Schemes and Time Limits

Post Office Minister Kevin Hollinrake recently announced that the Government has allocated £1 billion for compensatory measures. 

Over 4,000 individuals have been identified as eligible beneficiaries across three distinct schemes:

1. Group Litigation Order (GLO) Scheme: This initiative targets the 555 former postmasters who, despite prevailing in their collective legal battle, received relatively modest settlements due to substantial legal expenses. Each member of this group will now be offered £75,000; however, many are expected to advocate for higher sums. While there is no time restriction for financial redress under the GLO Scheme, the goal is for all claims to be heard by August 2024.
2. Overturned Convictions Scheme: Eligible individuals under this scheme are entitled to a prompt settlement of £600,000 or the opportunity to engage in negotiations for a more substantial compensation package. Additionally, all qualifying applicants are guaranteed an interim payment of £163,000. There is no time limit for financial reparation under the Overturned Convictions Scheme.
3. Horizon Shortfall Scheme: Designed for subpostmasters who were neither convicted nor part of the GLO litigation but who believe they suffered financial losses due to Horizon, this scheme offers a fixed compensation of £75,000 to each qualified individual. The Horizon Shortfall Scheme is still open for applications, and the Post Office will continue to assess claims as swiftly as possible.

Further information is available from GOV.UK Financial Redress Fact Sheet published May 8th, 2024.

Toxic Culture at the Post Office

The Horizon scandal unfolded over several decades. An effective organisational culture would have investigated concerns raised by employees and the Horizon system, but the Post Office prioritised protecting its reputation and the integrity of its systems above all else. 

This led to multiple cover-ups of the faults in the Horizon system, with the Post Office denying that they were aware of any problems even when faced with mounting evidence. In his March 2019 judgement on Bates and Others v Post Office Limited, Mr Justice Fraser stated that the Post Office’s culture also led to a lack of transparency and accountability in its decision-making processes.  

One issue that Lord Arbuthnot told the Post Office inquiry was the denial that remote access to Horizon could be possible. Despite being told that this was happening, the organisation continued to rely on the flawed Horizon system despite knowing it was causing problems, and it pursued prosecutions of subpostmasters without properly investigating the evidence. 

Halex Consulting: “The Horizon scandal is a stark example of how a dysfunctional organisational culture can lead to catastrophic consequences. It highlights the importance of cultivating a culture of integrity, transparency and accountability at all levels within organisations.”

Culture, Risk Management and Business Integrity

Risk management refers to the mindset and behaviour within an organisation that determines how risk is perceived, addressed, and incorporated into decision-making processes. Shared values, attitudes, norms and beliefs within organisational culture influence how risks and opportunities are identified, assessed, prioritised, managed and monitored.

A strong risk management culture is significant for several reasons:

• Proactive approach: It encourages a proactive rather than reactive approach to risk, helping organisations anticipate and prepare for potential threats and capitalise on opportunities.
• Informed decision making: By integrating risk considerations into decision-making processes, organisations can make more informed choices that balance potential benefits with possible downsides.
• Resilience: Robust risk management helps organisations build resilience, enabling them to better withstand and recover from unexpected events or crises.
• Compliance: Compliance with laws, regulations and standards related to risk management reduces the likelihood of fines, penalties and reputational damage.
• Performance: Effective risk management can enhance organisational performance by minimising losses, optimising returns and achieving strategic objectives.

The Post Office: Organisational Culture Risks and Governance Issues

The Post Office Horizon scandal was a catastrophic failure of organisational culture and risk management. Several key factors contributed to this scandal, including;

• Financial targets: The Post Office faced significant pressure to meet stringent financial targets. Subsequently, the focus on minimising costs and maximising revenues came at the expense of properly addressing issues with the Horizon system and fully investigating discrepancies. 
• Lack of transparency: A lack of transparency was a major factor in the Horizon scandal. The Post Office failed to fully disclose the limitations and flaws of the Horizon system, both to subpostmasters and to the courts in prosecutions. There was also a lack of adequate oversight mechanisms to detect and prevent the misuse of the flawed system. 
• Punitive culture: The Post Office fostered a punitive culture that blamed subpostmasters for discrepancies rather than seriously investigating the possibility of system errors. This culture of fear and intimidation discouraged subpostmasters from speaking out about their concerns and made them vulnerable to false accusations. 
• Failure to address concerns: Despite numerous subpostmasters raising concerns about the Horizon system, the Post Office failed to adequately address these issues. 
• Inadequate Board Performance Reviews and Internal Audits: The Post Office’s Board and internal audit function played a critical role in the scandal, both in terms of their failures and their potential for prevention. The Board should have provided more effective oversight of the organisation’s risk management practices and culture. 

Halex Consulting: “It is clear that the emphasis on meeting financial targets also discouraged transparency and encouraged a culture of denial and blame shifting.

The organisation seemed more interested in defending the integrity of its system rather than properly investigating the problems. This failure had devastating consequences for the subpostmasters who were wrongly accused and prosecuted.” 

Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Organisations

Integrating risk management culture with the overall organisational culture requires a deliberate and ongoing effort. Here are seven key strategies:

1. Leadership commitment: Senior management must lead by example to foster a strong risk management culture. This means consistently demonstrating a commitment to managing risks, making risk-informed decisions, and holding others accountable for doing the same. Senior management should clearly articulate the organisation’s risk appetite and tolerance and ensure these guidelines are understood at all levels. 
2. Clear communication: Effective communication is critical for ensuring everyone understands their role in managing risks. This involves providing regular training and updates on the organisation’s risk management framework, policies and procedures. Ensure messaging is simple, concise and avoids overly technical jargon.  
3. Executive risk management coaching: Provide coaching and development opportunities to ensure executives fully understand how to identify, assess and manage risks as part of their day-to-day activities. This may involve one-on-one coaching, workshops or peer learning groups. Focus on practical skills and scenarios relevant to their specific roles and responsibilities. Encourage them to model good risk management behaviours and champion a risk-aware culture.
4. Risk management consultancy: Consider engaging external risk management consultants or internal experts to provide objective advice and best practices. They can conduct risk assessments, identify vulnerabilities, recommend mitigation strategies and help embed a risk-aware approach into standard processes. Utilise their expertise to challenge assumptions, stimulate fresh thinking and drive continuous improvement in organisational culture and risk management.
5. Positive risk culture: Open dialogue about risks should be encouraged, creating a safe environment where employees feel comfortable raising concerns or suggesting improvements. Ensure a ‘no blame’ culture exists for reporting risks and near misses and reward good risk management practices, transparency and open communication.
6. Risk governance reviews: Bringing in external experts can provide fresh perspectives and best practices to enhance the organisation’s risk management capabilities. Consultants can conduct risk assessments, identify vulnerabilities and recommend strategies for improvement. Their objective advice can be invaluable in strengthening risk management processes and embedding a risk-aware culture.
7. Risk management frameworks: Embed risk management into existing processes and systems rather than treating it as a standalone activity. These reviews should seek input from a variety of stakeholders to identify areas for enhancement. The goal is to ensure risk management practices remain aligned with the organisation’s strategy, objectives and risk appetite and to identify opportunities for continuous improvement.

Halex Consulting: Final Thoughts about the Post Office Scandal

“The Post Office failed to address concerns about increased prosecutions linked to the Horizon system and enforced non-disclosure agreements to silence employees. While recognising the need to protect business interests, such agreements shouldn’t obstruct reporting of wrongdoing. Additionally, the Post Office engaged in a cover-up by withholding internal reports, blaming subpostmasters, and intimidating whistleblowers. This culture of fear perpetuated silence and obscured the truth, causing lasting damage to the organisation’s credibility and beyond.”

Chris Burt — Principal of Halex Consulting

Resources:

• Library of Congress Mr Bates vs The Post Office Spurs Possible Law Change. Publication date March 13th, 2024
• Criminal Cases Review Commission The CCRC and Post Office/ Horizon Cases. Publication date January 3rd, 2024
• JUSTICE FOR SUBPOSTMASTERS ALLIANCE Home Page. Last accessed May 13th, 2024
• SCRIBD (Uploaded by Nick Wallis) Second Sight Final Report. Last accessed May 13th, 2024 
• FREETHS Group Litigation Order against Post Office Limited Is Approved. Publication date March 28th, 2017
• GOV.UK Government to fund initial compensation package for vindicated postmasters. Publication date July 22nd, 2021
• UK Parliament Post Office and Horizon redress: Instruction to deliver. Publication date March 7th, 2024
• Independent Paula Vennells – live: Ex-Post Office CEO tells inquiry of fears over cost of Second Sight review into Horizon. Publication date May 23rd, 2024
• Sky News Post Office scandal latest: Alan Bates has ‘no sympathy’ as former CEO Paul Vennells faces more questions. Publication date May 23rd, 2024
• The Times Paula Vennells cries while giving evidence at Post Office inquiry — as it happened. Publication date May 22nd, 2024
• i News Five things we learned from Paula Vennells’ hearing at Post Office inquiry.  Publication date May 22nd, 2024
• The Sunday Times Paula Vennells caught out by own email at Post Office inquiry — as it happened. Publication date May 23rd, 2024
• Sky News Post Office Inquiry latest: Paula Vennells told she is talking ‘absolute rubbish’ after breaking down in tears. Publication date May 24th, 2024
• GOV.UK Wrongful Post Office convictions to be quashed through landmark legislation: 13 March 2024. Publication date March 13th, 2024
• BBC News Post Office lawyer ‘missed’ key Horizon finding. Publication date April 19th, 2024
• UK Parliament Post Office and Horizon — Compensation: interim report 2021-2022. Publication date February 17th, 2022
• UK Parliament  Written evidence submitted by Second Sight Forensic Accountants (POH0035). Publication date January 25th, 2022
• UK Parliament Management culture of the Post office. Publication date February 7th, 2024.